The Art of Persuasion

French President Emmanuel Macron has recently come under the spotlight. He chose to side with the U.S. and the UK on military action in Syria in April, a decision likely borne of his impulse to cling to America and keep alive his dream of reviving France as a great power. He also visited Washington, D.C. as Europe’s envoy in the hope of persuading the U.S. not to forsake the Iran nuclear agree- ment and to extend Europe’s exemption from Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Of most concern to Macron at present is the reestablish- ment of France and Germany’s central role in Europe, to push ahead with reform of the euro zone and to revitalize the European Union (EU).

Hard to sway

These are issues critical to the lasting security of the EU as well as to France’s own future stability and prosperity. Macron is thus busy shuttling back and forth between Berlin, Brussels and Strasbourg, trying to persuade Germany and the European Parliament to support his scheme for European reform.

His experience working in investment banks has equipped Macron with an ef- fective set of marketing techniques. The core content of his French iteration of EU reform remains in essence the same as the plan he proposed in a speech made at the illustrious Sorbonne University last September the creation of a European deposit insurance scheme, an enlarged European Stability Mechanism to cope with debt crises, a permanent European Monetary Fund, and a euro zone budget and fi nancial department.

In the past, Macron had only Brexit at hand to convince his European counter- parts of the necessity of his vision. But now,far-right parties have gained a foothold within Italian politics and the controversial Viktor Orbán has been reelected Hungarian prime minister by a landslide, posing a threat to the concepts of liberty, democ- racy and integration central to the EU. For Macron, reform of the euro zone is now a case of life or death for the European proj- ect. However, unlike Macron, a cautious Germany with a restricted Angela Merkel at the helm does not share his passion and fervor for restructuring.

Merkel’s current response to Macron remains almost as it was half a year ago. Despite her inclination to reach a consen- sus with France, Merkel has stated that German-French cooperation is always based on a different starting point and that “mutual compromise” is crucial. Her col- leagues in the Christian Social Union put it more bluntly despite Macron’s appeals to European interests, he is in reality focused on “France fi rst.”

In their approaches to winning interna- tional status externally and overcoming the populists internally, there exist significant differences between France and Germany although some common interests do remain. Sprawling nationalism and euro- skepticism, as Macron has alleged, will dilute the benefits the single market can provide the two countries, and without the EU’s support, France and Germany will pale on the international stage in comparison to other global economies.

Differing concerns

The major question facing France is the vast gap between the country’s ambition to be a world power and European leader and the real- ity of its sluggish economy. A series of reforms put forward after Macron took office will take a long time to render benefits, and further restructuring will likely encounter greater op- position. Macron believes that driving forward domestic reforms in parallel with reform of the euro zone will usher in complementary results. To this end, he wants to persuade Germany to inject more funds into the euro zone to stabilize market confidence and create a comfortable economic environment in France to win more time for France’s domestic reforms. Recovery of the national economy will consolidate France’s status as the leader of Europe, which can in turn embolden Macron in his EU reform efforts.

Several years of fiscal surplus leave Germany with the enviable quandary of how to spend the money sitting in the bank. The major issue, however, is not how, but where to spend, with the wider euro zone and Germany itself representing two divergent strategic destinations. In try- ing to convince the German public to bail out Greece in the midst of a government- debt crisis, Merkel invoked the idea that Germany’s economic prosperity was rooted in the European single market. Today then, the same line of argument makes it a hard sell to spend German money on France. Merkel, already a diminished figure in the “grand coalition,” also faces her most considerable opposition to the euro in the German parliament to date in the form of Alternative for Germany, and so lacks the freedom she once had to execute her plans.

As the major financier of euro zone reforms, Germany has reason to be cau- tious about the risks and expected returns of Macron’s designs. It is thus unlikely that Merkel will accept France’s radical reform scheme in its entirety. This is the likely ex- planation for why, despite Macron’s efforts to win German money by citing historic cooperation between Adenauer and de Gaulle, and Kohl and Mitterrand, they have so far borne little fruit.

Perceiving the lack of enthusiasm coming from Berlin, EU institutions eager to reinforce their status and boost their authority have already begun to align themselves with Macron. EU leaders are willing to support Macron’s reform package at the upcoming EU summit in June, as ei- ther currency alliance or the establishment of a budget and financial department will help to further expand and centralize EU authority and power. However, Macron has yet to cut a deal between the European Parliament members of different countries and the diverse political movements across national borders.

Gloomy reality

The 2019 elections for the European Parliament are fast approaching, and without a seat Macron’s En Marche must work hard to gain a foothold. The outcome of these elec- tions will be the fi rst quantifi able assessment of Macron’s popularity since he assumed offi ce. If he performs badly, then not only will reform of the euro zone be at risk, but his very reputation as a reformist president.

After years of turbulence, the EU is in need of reform, but there is no consensus on how to carry this out. Europe is out of sync, moving at different speeds, and driving all the constituent countries in the same direction toward European integra- tion is a seemingly impossible task. Macron’s reforms aim to establish a financial transfer payment coalition within the euro zone as a way to ease the development imbalance between the con- tinent’s north and south. However, such reforms would need to be funded by the rich countries of Northern Europe, which will only exacerbate preexisting conflicts within the union. Germany claims to have already discussed this issue with eight Northern European countries and they are all apparently wary of Macron’s plan.

If the conflicts between Northern and Southern Europe can be solved with money, then the political and ideological differences of Eastern and Western Europe remain a stumbling block for EU reforms. Central and Eastern European countries at odds with the EU are mostly non-euro zone economies. The acceleration of euro zone reform will only leave these already economically disadvantaged countries even further behind, fueling disillusion- ment with the broader European project and provoking secessionist sentiment. The hastening of reforms could come at the cost of the membership tally. This is the more profound reason why EU members like Germany are reluctant to get behind France’s radical reform.

Although plagued by thorny issues at home, in confronting the wayward behavior of Donald Trump, France and Germany still seem capable of coordinated action. Merkel paid a visit to America shortly after Macron, and raised the same topics as the French president in talks with Trump. Whether the efforts of the French and German leaders are enough to reestablish their respective coun- tries status as major powers, the answer will soon be revealed.